We examine nonearnings related disclosure and find that many firms voluntarily provided guidance on capital expenditure (CAPEX) This study examines the prevalence and intensity of nonearnings corporate guidance and how managers choose such guidance along with earnings guidance from a portfolio of forward-looking signals. Nonearnings guidance has recently piqued investors' interest. Guidance regarding firms' long-term value drivers, initiatives, and strategies-the focus of this paper-has been proposed as an alternative to (quarterly) earnings guidance (CFA Institute, 2006; US Chamber of Commerce, 2007; Deloitte, 2009) .
This study examines the prevalence and intensity of nonearnings corporate guidance and how managers choose such guidance along with earnings guidance from a portfolio of forward-looking signals. Nonearnings guidance has recently piqued investors' interest. Guidance regarding firms' long-term value drivers, initiatives, and strategies-the focus of this paper-has been proposed as an alternative to (quarterly) earnings guidance (CFA Institute, 2006 ; US Chamber of Commerce, 2007; Deloitte, 2009) . 1 Critics claim that, "earnings guidance promotes short-term thinking and does little or nothing to increase the company's long-term value" (Deloitte, 2009, p. 1) . Instead, they suggest that rather than projecting earnings with a horizon of one year or less, managers should communicate to investors about the activities that will contribute to the firm's earnings and returns in the long run. Critics argue that this change will mitigate short-termism in the capital markets and that such nonearnings guidance will bolster investors' confidence in the management by showing how managers will achieve long-term goals. Given this ringing endorsement, it is not surprising that in 2009 the National Investors Relations Institute (NIRI) asked for the first time in its annual corporate guidance survey about its member firms' nonearnings guidance practices (NIRI, 2009 ).
Despite increased interest in nonearnings guidance, empirical evidence of such guidance is limited. Hoskin, Hughes, and Ricks (1986) is the first study to observe that many firms voluntarily discuss their earnings and revenue projections, capital spending budget, order backlog, and major contracts at earnings announcements. Their evidence, however, is based on data 30 years old; since then, corporate communication has changed drastically due to changes in technology and the legal and regulatory environments. A notable study by Hutton, Miller, and Skinner (2003) examines verifiable forward-looking statements that accompany earnings guidance and finds that managers tend to supplement good-news earnings guidance with such statements to enhance the credibility of the earnings guidance. Their study, however, does not categorize and distinguish supplementary disclosure and their sample period ended before Regulation Fair Disclosure. A recent study by Lansford, Lev, and Tucker (2011) codes a variety of earnings component guidance and finds that managers' decisions to supplement earnings guidance with earnings component guidance are related to firm characteristics (e.g., low value relevance of earnings) rather than period-specific factors (e.g., good-news vs. bad-news earnings guidance). Chen et al. (2008) examine the credibility of earnings guidance with and without earnings component guidance. They find that, in cases of bad news, earnings guidance accompanied by component guidance is less accurate and more optimistically biased than earnings guidance not accompanied by component guidance. Han and Wild (1991) examine a particular type of earnings component guidance-revenue guidance. Wasley and Wu (2006) examine another type of earnings component guidance-cash flow guidance.
The above studies, except for Hoskin et al. (1986) , examine earnings component guidance such as revenue, expense, and cash flow forecasts. We distinguish our study by focusing on two types of forward-looking disclosure that contribute very little to current period earnings-capital expenditure (CAPEX) guidance and strategic plan disclosure (SPD). CAPEX/SPD guidance possesses four characteristics not present in earnings guidance. First, CAPEX/SPD guidance is long term, whereas earnings guidance is typically about the current period. Second, CAPEX/SPD guidance reveals information about the input or process of value creation, whereas the earnings number is a summary of the outcome of operations. Third, CAPEX/SPD guidance has been advocated by influential voices, whereas earnings guidance has been increasingly criticized. Last, managers are in a unique position to provide CAPEX/SPD because they know what investments and strategies are being undertaken at the firm. In contrast, financial analysts routinely publish earnings, revenue, and cash flow estimates regardless of whether managers publish their own estimates.
Managers have a portfolio of forward-looking signals to choose from for voluntary disclosure. CAPEX/SPD and earnings are among the most important choices. Prior voluntary disclosure research rarely takes the portfolio view and predominantly focuses on earnings guidance because of the importance of earnings in financial reporting and data availability.
3 On the few occasions when nonearnings guidance is examined, researchers ask under what circumstances earnings guidance is accompanied by nonearnings guidance, assuming that the two types of guidance are complements. On the other hand, when the trade associations called for replacing earnings guidance with nonearnings guidance, they assumed that CAPEX guidance and SPD are substitutes for earnings guidance. 4 We do not take a position regarding whether earnings guidance 2 Regulation Fair Disclosure was passed on October 23, 2000. The Regulation prohibits managers from disclosing to selected market participants (Agapova and Madura, 2008) . Managers' voluntary disclosure behaviors have changed after the Regulation (Wang, 2007; Bailey et al., 2003; Heflin, Subramanyam, and Zhang, 2003; Charoenrook and Lewis, 2009) . 3 The number of earnings guidance studies has increased greatly since First Call made the Company Issued Guidelines (CIG) database available in the early 2000s. 4 The CFA Institute has recommended that companies stop quarterly earnings guidance and "provide more meaningful, and potentially more frequent, communications about strategy and long-term vision. . ." (CFA 2006, emphasis added) . In and nonearnings guidance are complements or substitutes. Instead, we identify capital-market valuation, product-market competition, and labor-market monitoring incentives that determine the set of disclosure signals chosen by different types of firms. We examine the circumstances under which managers provide CAPEX/SPD without earnings guidance, earnings guidance without CAPEX/SPD guidance, both types of guidance, or neither type. We examine the disclosure decisions before the heated earnings guidance debate so that we might understand managers' behaviors free of the trade associations' influences. We hand collect forward-looking signals provided by the S&P 500 firms when they announced Fiscal Year 2005 earnings. This "snapshot," taken in spring 2006, was the last annual earnings announcement before the CFA Institute initiated the call to replace earnings guidance with nonearnings guidance. We code forward-looking signals into earning-related and nonearningsrelated categories. The former includes earnings and earnings components and the latter includes CAPEX guidance and SPD. Although 57% of the sample firms provide earnings guidance, 80% of the corporate guidance by number count is not earnings guidance and 37% of the sample firms provide CAPEX guidance and 50% provide SPD. The fact that nonearnings guidance is common is surprising because there has been little research on such guidance and the trade associations' calls for long-term investment and strategy guidance sound as if such guidance is rare.
Before investigating the determinants of managers' disclosure choices, we examine the effects of such guidance on stock liquidity to corroborate with the return-based evidence of the usefulness of nonearnings guidance provided by Hoskin et al. (1986) . We find some evidence that managers' disclosure of SPD and earnings component guidance is associated with a decrease in bid-ask spreads and that firms with SPD experience a larger increase in market depths than those without SPD.
We examine three determinants of managers' bundling choices: 1) earnings performance that captures the capital-market valuation incentive, 2) proprietary disclosure costs that capture the product-market competition incentive, and 3) long-term institutional ownership that captures the labor-market monitoring incentive. Voluntary disclosure is an important corporate decision because it addresses the information problem and agency problem at a firm (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Beyer et al., 2010) . We argue that when earnings are poor, managers are likely to withhold earnings guidance because of increased difficulty in predicting earnings and because unfavorable earnings guidance would decrease the stock price and consume managers' time in explaining the news. CAPEX/SPD guidance may be provided as useful information to compensate for the unavailability of earnings guidance to investors. 5 One externality of voluntary disclosure, especially the disclosure of strategic priorities and plans, is that the information may be used by the firm's competitors. We argue that SPD disclosure is less likely to be provided by growth firms, which would incur high proprietary disclosure costs, and is more likely to be provided by shakeout (turnaround) firms. 6 Voluntary disclosure facilitates monitoring of management and thus alleviates agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . For monitoring purposes, the more information the better. We predict that firms with higher long-term institutional ownership face a larger demand for information and thus are more likely to provide both earnings and nonearnings guidance.
the widely circulated report of the US Chamber of Commerce addressing the challenges of capital markets in the 21st century, the organization has asked all public companies to "seriously consider the permanent elimination of quarterly guidance on earnings per share" and recommended that "public companies promulgate additional information on their long-term business strategies" (US Chamber of Commerce, 2007, emphasis added). 5 Managers may also provide CAPEX/SPD guidance to redirect investors' attention away from managers' poor performance to their future actions. This behavior would not be value-maximizing. We cannot distinguish these two possibilities. 6 Gort and Klepper (1992) define "shakeout" as the stage between mature and decline. In this stage the number of producers begins to decline and firms either vanish or restructure to regain competitive advantage.
We separately analyze the bundling of earnings guidance with CAPEX guidance and with SPD for three reasons.
7 First, CAPEX guidance is quantitative and SPD is qualitative. Quantitative guidance is arguably more credible than qualitative guidance because the former can be easily verified ex post. Yet this does not mean that SPD is not credible at all. Gu and Li (2007) find positive stock price reaction to disclosure of strategies by high-tech firms, suggesting that such qualitative disclosure is still credible. Second, proprietary disclosure costs differ between these two types of guidance. CAPEX guidance typically includes an estimated dollar amount of the firm's overall capital spending and nothing else. However SPD delineates the activities and plans to be undertaken; such information could be very useful to competitors and carry high proprietary costs. Third, firms that potentially provide CAPEX guidance can be quite different from those that potentially provide SPD. If a firm's operations do not require significant capital investments, CAPEX guidance is not an issue. Yet firms with low capital spending may still disclose initiatives, strategies, and plans. For these reasons, even though CAPEX guidance and SPD both have long-term implications and are input based, we do not combine them.
We find that earnings performance and monitoring are the primary determinants for the disclosure choices of CAPEX guidance versus earnings guidance. A recent earnings decline is associated with firms' withholding earnings guidance; some firms provide CAPEX guidance instead.
8 Long-term institutional ownership is positively associated with the simultaneous issuance of earnings and CAPEX guidance.
We find that earnings performance and proprietary disclosure costs are the driving forces for the SPD versus earnings guidance disclosure choices. Firms are more likely to withhold earnings guidance after an earnings decline; some provide SPD instead. Firms in the growth stage of their life cycle are reluctant to provide SPD and tend to provide only earnings guidance, whereas those in the shakeout stage tend to provide SPD and withhold earnings guidance. We do not find long-term institutional ownership to be associated with SPD.
In sum, we document the prevalence of nonearnings guidance before the debate on earnings guidance gained momentum; find weak evidence of stock liquidity improvement associated with nonearnings guidance; and identify capital-market, product-market, and labor-market incentives for managers' bundling choices of earnings and nonearnings guidance. Earnings performancethe capital-market valuation incentive-explains the choices of CAPEX versus earnings guidance and of SPD versus earnings guidance: CAPEX guidance and SPD are provided in lieu of earnings guidance when earnings are poor. The stage of a firm's life cycle-the product-market competition incentive-explains the issuance of SPD but not CAPEX guidance, consistent with our expectation that proprietary disclosure costs are higher for growth firms than for shakeout firms and that such costs are a serious concern in the disclosure of SPD. Long-term institutional ownership-the labor-market monitoring incentive-explains the disclosure of CAPEX guidance but not SPD, perhaps because only institutional investors are sophisticated enough to decipher CAPEX guidance (which is an abstract number and is useful only when it is combined with other information), whereas both institutional and retail investors can easily understand SPD (which is descriptive).
9
Our study makes three contributions. First, while most of the past four decades' voluntary corporate disclosure research centers on earnings guidance, our study extends the literature by 7 Among our sample firms, 62.3% provide either, 25.2% provide both, and 37.7% provide neither. 8 This statement is based on the marginal-effect analysis, which is more comprehensive than pairwise group comparisons for which z-statistics are reported (see Section V. B). 9 For example, investors may need other information such as industry and macro-economy knowledge to determine whether a CAPEX budget of $100 million for a particular firm is good news or bad news.
providing evidence of firms' use of a variety of forward-looking signals beyond earnings guidance. The scope of forward-looking disclosure in our study is unprecedentedly large. Moreover, we emphasize a portfolio view of corporate guidance and examine managers' four disclosure choices (earnings only, CAPEX/SPD only, CAPEX/SPD and earnings, and none) rather than the yes or no one-dimensional analysis used in prior research.
Second, although it is not the purpose of the study to directly evaluate the arguments and recommendations in the earnings guidance debate, our findings contribute to this on-going debate (Katz and Mclntosh, 2009 ). The critics argue that earnings guidance fuels the "earnings game," which in turn induces management myopia and investors' earnings fixation (Cheng, Subramanyam, and Zhang, 2006; CFA Institute, 2006 ; US Chamber of Commerce, 2007) . 10 Others warn that eliminating earnings guidance would only increase information asymmetry and market uncertainty without reducing short-termism (Janjigian, 2003; Houston, Lev, and Tucker, 2010) . Our study adds a voice to this debate. We show that companies were providing many types of nonearnings guidance even before the debate and that investment/strategy guidance was common. This aspect of corporate guidance has been missing in the earnings guidance debate. Moreover, the trade associations' recommendation of replacing earnings guidance with investment/strategy guidance may not be optimal for all firms. Our evidence suggests that longterm institutional investors prefer to have both earnings and nonearnings guidance as opposed to curtailing earnings guidance. A firm's decision to provide SPD in lieu of earnings guidance is not necessarily a sign that the firm is refocusing on its long-term value.
Last, we contribute to the literature of qualitative forward-looking disclosure. As Beyer et al. (2010, p. 312 ) point out, corporate disclosure to a large extent consists of qualitative information and analyzing such information would provide a more complete view of managers' disclosure behaviors. However, measuring qualitative information is challenging, which is perhaps why there have been only a handful of studies of qualitative forward-looking disclosure (Guo, Lev, and Zhou, 2004; Jones, 2007; Gu and Li, 2007) .
11 Our unique SPD data allow us to ask when managers opt for qualitative, nonfinancial disclosure instead of quantitative, financial forecasts. The evidence enriches our understanding of managers' tradeoffs in their disclosure decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section I develops the hypotheses. Section II explains sample collection, Section III examines the frequency of nonearnings guidance, and Section IV examines the role of nonearnings guidance in improving stock liquidity. In Sections V and Section VI we examine managers' bundling decisions of CAPEX versus earnings guidance and of SPD versus earnings guidance. Section VII reports the results using guidance collected from all sources and Section VIII concludes.
I. Hypothesis Development
Following the motives discussed in Healy and Palepu (2001) and Beyer et al. (2010) , we develop hypotheses to explain managers' disclosure choices from three perspectives.
A. Capital-Market Incentive for Voluntary Disclosure
Voluntary disclosure is a remedy for a firm's information problem, a problem that occurs when managers know more about the firm than do their investors. Unless managers voluntarily disclose their private information, investors would assume that each firm has an average performance and the value of well-performing firms would be discounted (Akerlof, 1970) . Thus, firms with good performance have incentives to make voluntary disclosure (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1985) . 12 In contrast, bad news not only causes investors to revise expectations downward but also consumes managers' time in explaining the bad news (Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough, 2004) . Moreover, firms experiencing bad news are likely to be shrouded in great uncertainty and as a result future earnings are less visible to managers.
13 Consistent with these theories, prior research finds that managers curb earnings guidance after poor earnings (Miller, 2002; Houston et al., 2010) . Withholding earnings guidance after poor performance could be value-enhancing as long as investors are compensated for the information loss from the omitted earnings guidance. To ensure that investors' information needs are met, managers may emphasize input metrics over which they have control while withholding guidance of earnings-a summary output metric. Thus, we expect CAPEX/SPD guidance to be issued in lieu of earnings guidance after poor earnings performance.
H1: Earnings performance is positively associated with the issuance of earnings guidance and negatively associated with the issuance of CAPEX/SPD guidance.
B. Product-Market Incentive for Voluntary Disclosure
The information communicated to the capital markets may be detrimental to a firm's viability in the product markets. For example, although disclosing marketing plans is encouraging to investors, competitors may design strategies in time to counter the surge. Proprietary disclosure costs challenge managers to balance the benefits of disclosing useful information to the capital markets against the costs of disclosure to their product-market competition (Verrecchia, 1983; Wagenhofer, 1990) .
Proprietary disclosure costs may not play a major role in managers' decisions to provide earnings and CAPEX guidance because both are provided in highly aggregated numbers. SPD, on the other hand, provides specific plans and strategies that competitors may either imitate or counteract. We expect growth firms to have higher SPD proprietary disclosure costs than mature firms because growth firms develop unique strategies, business processes, technologies, and products. In contrast, firms in the shakeout stage of their life cycle have lower SPD disclosure costs because their turnaround strategies are likely to be of little use to established, successful firms. Therefore, we predict: H2: SPD is less likely to be provided by growth firms and more likely to be provided by firms in the shakeout stage of their life cycle.
C. Labor-Market Incentive for Voluntary Disclosure
An agency problem arises when owners hire professional agents to manage the firm but the agents' interests are not totally aligned with those of the owners. The agency problem reduces a firm's equity value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Although the premise of an agency problem is the conflict of interests between managers and owners, managers have incentives to reduce agency costs and maximize firm value under the assumptions of investors' rational expectations and managers' equity-related compensation. One mechanism for minimizing agency costs is monitoring, which requires information as inputs (Healy and Palepu, 2001) . Among investors, long-term institutional investors are expected to be most active in monitoring the management because they have large stakes in the firm and they are sophisticated enough to understand the financial and nonfinancial information disclosed. Again, for monitoring purposes, the more information the better. For example, with CAPEX information institutional investors would be able to evaluate, monitor, and influence managers' investment decisions. All else being equal, investors' demand for information for monitoring would lead to more voluntary disclosure by managers. Therefore, we predict: H3: Firms with high long-term institutional ownership are more likely to provide both earnings and nonearnings guidance than those with low institutional ownership.
II. Sample
We select the S&P 500 firms as our sample because these firms are the leading companies in major industries and, in aggregate, account for about 75% of the US equity market. We take a snapshot of these firms' guidance practices at their earnings announcements for Fiscal Year 2005.
14 The earnings announcement event is chosen because it is a firm's most important channel for communicating with the capital markets (Bamber and Cheon, 1998; Chen, DeFond, and Park, 2002; Francis, Schipper, and Vincent, 2002) . It is also the most frequently used venue for disclosing forward-looking information. For example, by 2003, 70% of annual earnings forecasts and 51% of quarterly earnings forecasts were issued at earnings announcement dates (Anilowski, Feng, and Skinner, 2007, Table II) .
We collect forward-looking signals from the earnings announcement press release and the presentation portion of the earnings conference call; the latter is typically hosted on the same day as the former.
15 Our final sample is 488 firms after 12 firm observations are excluded for missing earnings announcements. The signals are classified into 18 types in two categories and six sub-categories, as shown in Table I . Appendix A provides examples of disclosure and coding.
With the exception of SPD, we code the horizon (quarterly, annual, or long term) and specificity (point, range, or other) for each type of guidance. A point estimate is more specific than a range estimate and a range estimate is more specific than guidance issued in other forms. We refer to 14 For 17 firms whose fiscal year ends in April or May, we use their 2004 earnings announcements because of data availability. Compustat labels a fiscal year ending before June of Year t as "fiscal year t-1," though we observe that most S&P firms with fiscal year-ends in January through May of Year t refer to their fiscal year as "year t." We ensure the consistency of our coded data with Compustat. 15 We obtained most of the earnings announcement press releases from Business Wire and PR Newswire. For a few firms whose press releases were missing in these newswires, we searched the companies' websites and 8-K filings. We obtained almost all earnings announcement conference call transcripts from FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire. When a conference call transcript was missing in FD Wire, we searched for the transcript on the company's website. estimates in a point or range form as "hard guidance" and others as "soft guidance." If disclosure of the same type and horizon appears in the press release and in the conference call, we count the disclosure that is more specific. For earnings guidance, we separately code guidance on generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and non-GAAP earnings. Earnings guidance is typically issued in earnings per share (EPS), earnings growth, or dollar amount. For revenue guidance we separately code guidance on total sales and organic sales (also called "comparable store" or "same store" sales). Revenue guidance is typically issued in either dollar amount or percentage change from the previous year's number. The code for cash flow forecast refers to guidance of either operating cash flows or free cash flows.
16 CAPEX guidance is planned capital spending typically provided in dollar amount, percentage of sales, or percentage of the previous year's CAPEX. The recurring-cost category has nine types and each type is self-explanatory. Note that a firm could have more than one code for "other recurring expense" guidance. Segment guidance has four types and each is coded only if information is provided for at least two segments. The above guidance is mostly quantitative.
SPD-specific initiatives, strategies, priorities, and action plans-are largely qualitative. Their coding requires sound judgment and consistency. More than one SPD may be coded for a firm. For example, if a firm discloses 1) the number of planned store openings and closings in geographical locations, 2) a schedule for clinical trials of specific products, and 3) a plan for building a new distribution center, then three SPD codes are assigned to the company. If a firm projects fund allocations to specific investments after disclosing the CAPEX guidance number, we code the projected fund allocations as one SPD. We do not code statements that are so general that peer firms could make the same disclosure with ease. 17 16 When a firm provides both, we code them as one cash flow forecast and one CAPEX forecast, even if the firm does not explicitly provide CAPEX guidance. 17 For example, the following statement is not coded as SPD: "In 2006, we will focus on providing better service to our customers, improving the efficiency of our network and increasing the financial returns on our business" (Union Pacific, 2005 earnings announcement press release, PR Newswire, 1/19/2006).
Table II. Frequency of Firms Providing Corporate Guidance
We code the S&P 500 firms' earnings announcement press releases for Fiscal Year 2005 and the presentation portion of earnings conference calls. The available sample is 488 firms. For each type of forward-looking disclosure except for SPD, we code the horizon (e.g., quarterly, annual, or long term) and specificity (hard vs. soft, where "hard" refers to guidance provided in a point or range estimate). The codes for SPD and "other recurring expense" may repeat. The code for quarterly guidance may repeat. For example, if earnings forecasts for two quarters are provided, they are coded as two disclosures. The proportion of sample firms providing a given type of guidance is indicated in parentheses. Table II reports the number of firms that provide a given type of guidance. The first three columns present "hard or soft guidance" with quarterly, annual, and long-term horizons and the last three columns present only hard guidance. Although SPD is not coded for horizon or specificity, for exhibition convenience we list SPD as if it is hard annual guidance. The percentage of sample firms that provide the given type of hard guidance with an annual horizon is presented in parentheses.
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III. Prevalence of Nonearnings Guidance
The data show that firms commonly provide a wide range of guidance beyond earnings guidance. For example, for hard annual guidance, 37% of the sample firms provide CAPEX guidance, 34% forecast revenue, and 41% forecast the effective tax rate or tax expense for the coming year. Among our sample firms, 50% discuss specific initiatives, strategies, and action plans. By a number count across all firms, a surprising 80% of corporate guidance items are nonearnings guidance. The large number is in sharp contrast to the little attention that researchers and the media have paid to nonearnings guidance.
Comparing the "hard guidance" column with the "hard or soft guidance" column of the same horizon, we observe that over 90% of the CAPEX and earnings guidance is hard guidance. In the rest of the paper we focus on hard guidance. Comparing guidance of the same type across horizons, we observe that corporate guidance predominantly has an annual horizon regardless of guidance type. When firms provide guidance two or three years out, the guidance is often about CAPEX, earnings, and revenue. In untabulated analysis, we observe that the average number count of hard guidance items for our sample firms is 7.8; the averages for quarterly, annual, and long-term guidance are 2.2, 5.2, and 0.4, respectively. That is, on average the percentages of quarterly, annual, and long-term guidance items are 28.2%, 66.7%, and 5.1% per firm. Because an overwhelming majority of guidance is annual, we use annual guidance in the rest of this paper unless we state otherwise.
IV. Nonearnings Guidance and Information Asymmetry Reduction
A claimed benefit of public corporate disclosure is to level the playing field for the informationally privileged and unprivileged and ultimately improve a firm's stock liquidity and shareholder return (Diamond, 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) . We examine whether nonearnings guidance reduces information asymmetry and therefore improves stock liquidity. Such evidence would indicate that nonearnings guidance is credible and useful, consistent with Hoskin et al.'s (1986) return-based finding that investors react to nonearnings disclosure.
Following Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993) , we measure stock liquidity by the quoted bid-ask spreads and market depths. When market makers suspect a large proportion of informed traders, they increase the bid-ask spread and decrease the quoted number of shares at which the bid and ask prices are good (i.e., "market depth") (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985) . For each quote during the trading hours on each trading day, we calculate a firm's 1) relative spread-the difference between the ask and bid prices scaled by the average of the two and 2) quoted depththe sum of the quoted ask and bid shares (Lee et al., 1993; Coller and Yohn, 1997; Chae, 2005; Verrecchia and Weber, 2006) . A firm's daily spread is the average relative spread during the day; its daily depth is the sum of all quoted depths during the day scaled by the number of common stock shares outstanding at day's end. For each firm we compute the changes in bid-ask spreads and market depths from the 10-day window before the earnings announcement to the 10-day window after it. Consistent with Chae (2005) , our untabulated results indicate that stock liquidity generally increases after the earnings announcement event.
We are interested in whether the change in liquidity from the 10 days before to the 10 days after the disclosure event is associated with nonearnings guidance. We estimate the following regressions, where CAPEX, SPD, EG (for earnings guidance), and OER (for other earnings related guidance) are indicator variables for a firm providing the respective guidance:
(1)
Table III. Nonearnings Guidance and Reduction of Information Asymmetry
We collect bid-ask spreads and market depths around the earnings announcement event (Day 0) from the TAQ database. The bid-ask spread of a quote is the difference between ask and bid prices, scaled by the average of the two. The market depth of a quote is the sum of ask and bid shares. A firm's daily bid-ask spread is the average bid-ask spread during trading hours on the listed stock exchange. A firm's daily market depth is the sum of quoted depth during trading hours on the listed exchange, scaled by the number of shares outstanding. Spread is the change in average daily bid-ask spread from the [-11, -2] Panel A of Table III shows that the decrease in bid-ask spreads is larger for firms that provide SPD than for those that do not (Column 2). After controlling for the effect of earnings guidance, we find that SPD is still weakly associated with a spread reduction (Column 3). The last column shows that the effect of SPD is subsumed by earnings component guidance. Panel B shows strong evidence that SPD is associated with an increase in market depths after controlling for the effects of earnings guidance and earnings component guidance. Finding an increase in market depths and a decrease in bid-ask spreads would be strong evidence for liquidity improvement. We find that SPD increases market depths in Model (2) and decreases bid-ask spreads in a partial model of (1), but, perhaps due to our small sample size, find no statistical significance in the full model of bid-ask spreads. We do not find that CAPEX guidance is associated with changes in spreads and depths. Thus, we have some evidence that nonearnings guidance, especially SPD, improves stock liquidity, but the evidence is weak.
V. Managers' Choices of CAPEX versus Earnings Guidance
To examine how managers bundle earnings guidance with CAPEX guidance, we retain 436 of the 488 firms that report CAPEXs for either Fiscal Year 2005 or 2006. In other words, firms that do not incur CAPEXs are excluded because their CAPEX guidance decision is a nonissue. Panel A of Table IV shows the number of firms partitioned by the disclosure choices: 121 firms (28%) provide neither earnings nor CAPEX guidance, 56 firms (13%) provide CAPEX guidance but not earnings guidance, 139 firms (32%) give earnings guidance but not CAPEX guidance, and 120 firms (27%) provide both.
A. Empirical Model
In Hypotheses 1 and 3 we predict that managers' disclosure choices of CAPEX versus earnings guidance are related to earnings performance and long-term institutional ownership. We use prior-year earnings as the benchmark for performance and define We control for other factors that may affect managers' disclosure decisions: 1) industry practices; 2) management philosophy; 3) earnings uncertainty; and 4) CAPEX intensity, variability, and expected change. Firms in the same industries have a tendency to act alike because of similar operations and business environments or peer pressure. 20 For example, in Appendix B we plot managers' use of annual versus quarterly guidance horizons by industry; industry patterns emerge clearly. We use PeerEG, measured as the proportion of peer firms in the Fama-French-48 industry that issue annual earnings guidance at the 2005 earnings announcement, to capture industry practices of providing earnings guidance. Similarly, we construct PeerCAP for CAPEX guidance industry practice.
Management philosophy about transparency is a major determinant for firms' voluntary disclosures. For example, "management philosophy" is the most popular reason selected by corporate respondents for not providing guidance: 41% for not providing earnings guidance and 47% for not providing nonearnings financial guidance (NIRI 2009). Managers who believe in transparency 19 We thank Brian Bushee for providing the institutional ownership data. The data are updated annually. 20 Managers tend to follow their peers because doing so is safe in the "blame game" or because firms receive advice from the same investor relations consulting firms and trade associations. Empirical studies have documented evidence of managers' social learning behaviors (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1998; Brown, Gordon, and Wermers, 2006; Tse and Tucker, 2010) .
Table IV. CAPEX Guidance versus Earnings Guidance
We retain are likely to provide both earnings and nonearnings guidance. Management philosophy is not observable and we infer it from the firm's disclosure other than the guidance items under examination. That is, we count the occurrences of annual and long-term hard guidance that is not earnings guidance, CAPEX guidance, or SPD and use this number as a proxy for management philosophy ("Transparent"). 21 This measure also likely captures the precision of managers' private information and managers' tendency to disclose voluntarily increases with the precision of their private signals.
Earnings uncertainty can affect either the demand for earnings guidance or the supply of it. When earnings uncertainty increases, investors' demand for earnings guidance increases, but managers' supply of it decreases because managers may not have a clear vision of earnings themselves (Verrecchia, 1990 We expect CAPEX intensity to affect the demand for CAPEX guidance: investors request information about CAPEX if capital expending is material (Heitzman, Walsey, and Zimmerman, 2010) . CAPEX intensity, CAPintense, is measured as the ratio of net property, plants, and equipment over total assets at the end of 2005. When a firm's CAPEX fluctuates greatly from year to year, the demand for information about future CAPEX increases, but managers may be reluctant to supply it because of the firm's uncertain investment opportunities. CAPEX variability, StdCAP, is measured as the standard deviation of CAPEX in the five years ending with 2005, deflated by the average level in the period. Whether the demand or supply factor dominates is unclear, so we do not predict the coefficient on StdCAP. We also consider the change of CAPEXs from 2005 to 2006, ChgCAP, and expect managers to be more likely to disclose a planned increase than a decrease because expansions are typically better news than cutbacks.
In addition, we control for firm risk and analyst coverage. Firms with a higher systematic risk may disclose the budgeted scale of new investments to address investors' concern about underinvestment by risk-averse managers. We measure firm risk, Beta, in a market model using daily returns in the one-year period ending 10 days before the 2005 earnings announcement. We include analyst coverage because analysts are important users of guidance. Analyst is measured as the number of earnings estimates for 2006 included in the most recent consensus before the 2005 earnings announcement. Below is the multinomial logit model, where the categorical (unordered) variable A refers to the four disclosure-choices groups in Panel A of Table IV. Prob(A) = F(a 0 + a 1 EPSdecline + a 2 LTIO + a 3 PeerCAP + a 4 PeerEG + a 5 Transparent + a 6 Disper + a 7 CAPintense + a 8 StdCAP + a 9 ChgCAP + a 10 Beta + a 11 Analyst + ε).
(3)
B. Test Results
Multinomial logit estimation requires a base group even though the eventual inferences do not depend on the choice of the base group. 22 A coefficient for the other groups ("target group") represents the difference in the coefficients between the target and base groups. The exponential transformation of a coefficient is the odds ratio, which measures the proportional change in probability of a firm's being in the target group as a percentage of the proportional change in its probability of being in the base group when the covariate increases by one, while other variables are held constant. While coefficients and odds ratios reflect changes in probability for the target group relative to changes for the base group, marginal effects reflect the absolute changes in probability of each disclosure choice when only one covariate changes. Marginal effects do not depend on the choice of the base group and allow us to gauge the economic importance of the test results (Denis and Mihov, 2003) . We draw inferences mainly from the marginal effects.
Panel B of Table IV presents the distribution of nonindicator variables. Note that LTIO, PeerEG, PeerCAP, CAPintense, StdCAP, and ChgCAP are all ratios and Beta is a number close to one. Before estimating the multinomial logit model, we scale these variables by 10 so that each odds ratio measures the change in probabilities when the raw variable increases by 10%. Disper has a mean of 0.004. We scale this variable by 1,000 to allow the odds ratio to reflect an increment of 0.001 in raw Disper.
Panel C reports the multinomial logit results when the base group is the firms that provide only earnings guidance. We use the "earnings guidance only" group as the base group because this group is most familiar to researchers and practitioners. On the left, we compare the group that provides neither earnings nor CAPEX guidance ("none") with the base group. In the middle we compare the group that provides CAPEX guidance but not earnings guidance ("CAPEX only") with the base group. On the right we compare the group that provides both earnings and CAPEX guidance ("both") with the base group.
The coefficient on LTIO in the right comparison is significantly positive at 0.199 with a z-statistic of 1.73. Its odds ratio of 1.221 suggests that an increase in long-term institutional ownership by 10% would make a firm 22.1% more likely to supplement earnings guidance with CAPEX guidance than to issue only earnings guidance. The coefficients on PeerEG in the left and middle comparisons are significantly negative, suggesting that when more peers provide earnings guidance, firms are less likely to be in the "none" or "CAPEX only" group. That is, a firm is more likely to forecast earnings when more peers do. The coefficients on PeerCAP in the middle and right comparisons are significantly positive, indicating that when more peers provide CAPEX guidance, a firm is more likely to be in the "CAPEX only" or "both" group. In other words, a firm is more likely to provide CAPEX guidance when more peers do. The coefficient on Transparent is significantly negative in the left comparison and positive in the right comparison, consistent with our expectation that managers' overall attitude toward transparency or their information uncertainty influences the number of disclosures that are examined in this test. The coefficient on Disper is significantly positive in the left and middle comparisons, suggesting that firms are less likely to provide earnings guidance when earnings predictions are more uncertain. CAPintense has a significantly positive coefficient in the middle and right comparisons, indicating that firms with more intensive CAPEX are more likely to provide CAPEX guidance.
The above are relative probability changes in pairwise group comparisons. The marginal effects provide a more complete picture. Before discussing the marginal effects in Panel D, we first present in the bottom row the base probability of a "sample-mean firm" choosing each disclosure choice. The likelihood of an average firm's issuing no guidance, only CAPEX guidance, only earnings guidance, or both types of guidance is 19.3%, 14.4%, 38.9%, and 27.4%, respectively. As in all discrete-dependent-variable models, marginal effects vary at each data point. We follow the convention and calculate the marginal effects at sample means indicated in the "location" column (for an indicator variable, the location value is zero, which is the sample mode in Sections V and VI). The "change" column specifies the incremental change of the variable from "location," while others are held constant at the location values. The remaining columns report the incremental change in the probability of each disclosure choice.
Even though the coefficient on EPSdecline has a z-statistic of 1.36, only weakly significant in a one-tailed test in the left comparison in Panel C, its marginal effects are economically large. After an earnings decline, the likelihood of a firm's providing earnings guidance decreases by 17.0% (that is, −7.1% for earnings only and -9.9% for both earnings and CAPEX) and the likelihood of providing only CAPEX guidance increases by 7.5%. The overall effect is a curbing of earnings guidance with some firms replacing earnings guidance with CAPEX guidance. When long-term institutional ownership changes by 10%, a firm's likelihood of issuing both earnings and CAPEX guidance increases by 3.6% (from 27.4% to 31.0%). Meanwhile, the likelihood of providing only earnings guidance is lower by 2.8% (from 38.9% to 36.1%). Peer pressure or industry commonality for issuing earnings and CAPEX guidance is evident. If 10% more peers issue earnings guidance, firms are 6.1% more likely to issue earnings guidance (that is, 5.3% for issuing earnings only and 0.8% for both earnings and CAPEX). If 10% more peers provide CAPEX guidance, firms are 7.2% more likely to issue CAPEX guidance (that is, 2.3% for CAPEX only and 4.9% for both earnings and CAPEX). Management philosophy or managers' information uncertainty is important: if investors observe one more forecast other than earnings, CAPEX, or SPD, the firm is 6.9% more likely to be in the "both" group and 7.5% less likely to be in the "none" group. When earnings are more uncertain by an increment of 0.001 in Disper, a firm is 4.6% (that is, 3.4%+1.2%) more likely to withhold earnings guidance. When capital intensity increases by 10%, a firm is 4.6% (that is, 2.4%+2.2%) more likely to issue CAPEX guidance.
As expected, therefore, managers' disclosure choices are related to capital-market (e.g., earnings performance) and labor-market (e.g., monitoring) incentives as well as industry practices, management philosophy/information uncertainty, and other demand/supply factors for CAPEX and earnings guidance.
VI. Managers' Choices of SPD versus Earnings Guidance
To examine how managers bundle earnings guidance with SPD, we retain 458 of the 488 firms that have cash flow data available in Compustat for calculating the life-cycle variables. 23 Panel A of Table V reports the number of firms partitioned by the disclosure choices: 104 firms (23%) provide neither earnings nor SPD, 82 firms (18%) provide SPD but no earnings guidance, 119 firms (26%) give earnings guidance but no SPD, and 153 firms (33%) provide both.
A. Empirical Model
The empirical model is similar to Equation (3) with the modifications detailed below. We add indicator variables for a firm's stage in its life cycle to test H2. 24 Dickinson (2011) identifies a firm's stage in the life cycle from its cash flow patterns. A firm is in the introduction stage if it has negative operating cash flows (CFO), negative investing cash flows (CFI), and positive financing cash flows (CFF). In other words, the company uses external capital to fund operations and investments. A firm is in the growth stage if it generates positive CFO and continues to use external capital to fund investments (that is, negative CFI and positive CFF). A mature firm has positive CFO, negative CFI, and negative CFF; that is, it is a "cash cow," using internal capital 23 The excluded observations are all banks. 24 In untabulated tests we do not find that the life-cycle variables explain managers' choices of CAPEX vs. earnings guidance.
Table V. Strategic Plan Disclosure versus Earnings Guidance
We exclude Disper is winsorized at 99%. In this panel we multiply LTIO, PeerEG, PeerSPD, and Beta by 10 so that the odds ratio is interpreted as the proportionate change in likelihood when the unscaled variable increases by 10%. We scale Disper by 10 3 so that the odds ratio measures the proportionate change in likelihood when the unscaled variable increases by 0.001. The z-statistics are in parentheses. Panel C presents the marginal effects of increasing a covariate (unscaled) from the "location" value (0 for indicator variables and mean for others) by the "change" amount, while holding other covariates at their location values. to fund investments, pay down debts, and buy back shares. A declining firm is characterized by negative CFO and positive CFI; that is, the firm incurs more operating cash outflows than inflows and sells off assets to raise cash. The rest are classified as shakeout firms. The numbers of our sample firms in the five life-cycle stages are 9, 105, 280, 57, and 7, respectively. Given the small number of firms in the introduction and decline stages, we combine the introduction and growth firms and assign one to the dummy Growth and combine the shakeout and declining firms and assign one to the dummy Shakeout. 25 We assign the value of 0 to the 280 mature firms for variables Growth and Shakeout.
Panel A. Test Sample
The model includes most variables used in Equation (3): EPSdecline, LTIO, Transparent, PeerEG, Disper, Beta, and Analyst. We construct a variable PeerSPD, the equivalent of PeerCAP, to proxy for industry practices regarding SPD. The sample mean of PeerSPD is 0.505. We add a dummy QtrGuide for "quarterly earnings guidance" to control for the possibility that firms use SPD to replace quarterly earnings guidance-a disclosure policy that the trade associations promote. QtrGuide takes the value of one if a firm provides quarterly hard earnings guidance at the 2005 earnings announcement and zero otherwise. The sample mean of QtrGuide is 0.378.
The following equation summarizes our multinomial logit model, where the categorical variable B refers to the four disclosure-choices groups in Panel A of Table V . Table IV , before estimating the model we scale the ratios and Beta by 10 and Disper by 1,000 for convenient interpretation of the odds ratios. Panel B of Table V reports the estimation with the base group being "earnings guidance only" and the marginal effects in Panel C provide a better picture of the effects of covariates on the disclosure choices. The bottom row reports the probabilities for a sample-mean firm to issue no guidance, only SPD, only earnings guidance, or both. The marginal effects measure the deviations from these base probabilities. After an earnings decline, a firm is 14.1% less likely to provide only earnings guidance and 7.8% more likely to provide only SPD. LTIO has no effect on the disclosure choices. If a firm is growing, its likelihood of providing only earnings guidance is 14.5% more than that for mature firms; meanwhile, its likelihood of providing SPD decreases by 13.8% (that is, 5.5%+8.3%). If a firm is in a shakeout stage, the likelihood of providing only SPDs is 18.2% more than that for mature firms, whereas the likelihood of providing earnings guidance decreases (13.3% lower for "earnings guidance only" and 10.6% lower for "both"). The marginal effects of PeerEG and Transparent are similar to those in the earnings versus CAPEX guidance test. PeerSPD has no effect. Although Beta and Analyst are significant in some pairwise comparisons in Panel B, their marginal effects are trivial. If a firm issues quarterly earnings guidance, it is more likely to move to the "earnings only" and "both" groups and less likely to the "none" and "SPD only" groups, suggesting that quarterly and annual earnings guidance often appear together.
B. Test Results
As in
26
To sum up, consistent with our expectations, the capital-market (e.g., earnings performance) and product-market (e.g., a firm's life-cycle stage) incentives explain managers' disclosure choices of SPD versus earnings guidance. However, inconsistent with our expectation, the labor-market (e.g., monitoring) incentive has no explanatory power. Long-term institutional investors appear to demand CAPEX guidance to a larger extent than do retail investors, but their preferences 25 The "shakeout" group is a catch-all group with firms in heterogeneous situations. Some firms could be stockpiling cash through internal operations and shedding unproductive assets (positive CFO and CFI) and might be acquisition hunters. Some could be facing eroding profitability from product competition and paying off debts to cut interest costs (negative CFI and CFF). The commonality of these situations is that this stage of their life cycle is transitory and that firms' turnaround strategies are specific to their situations and not very useful to their competitors. 26 The evidence does not tell us whether SPD is used to replace quarterly earnings guidance, because one would expect a decrease of probability for the "SPD only" and "both" groups (the groups that issue SPD) and an increase of probability for the "none" and "earnings only" groups (the groups that withhold SPD).
for SPD are indistinguishable. The difference exists perhaps because institutional investors are sophisticated enough to decipher CAPEX guidance, whereas SPD is easily understandable to retail as well as sophisticated investors. This conjecture is consistent with the economic theories about the role of investor sophistication in voluntary disclosure (Dye, 1998; Suijs, 2007) .
VII. Supplementary Analysis with Corporate Guidance from All Sources
The previous analyses use guidance data collected at firms' earnings announcement dates. Although earnings announcements are firms' most important disclosure events for guidance, managers do provide guidance at other times. 27 In this section we augment the data with guidance collected from nonearnings announcement dates in the 90-day window after the prior-year earnings announcement date (i.e., the collection date of the original data). The 90-day window corresponds to a quarterly reporting cycle and is proportionate to an annual reporting cycle. The combined data are representative of corporate guidance issued in all public channels.
We read all sample firms' press releases published in "Business Wire" and "PR Newswire" and exclude chief executive officer (CEO) change, dividend, share repurchases, and acquisition announcements (corporate guidance rarely appears in such announcements). We code the 303 remaining news releases that may contain corporate guidance at a chance better than remote and identify guidance of any sort from 54 of the articles. Recall that we focus on the existence of a particular type of guidance along with guidance specificity and horizon. We add new guidance to the original data if the new guidance is hard guidance of a new type or new horizon. If neither the type nor horizon is new, we replace an existing guidance item with the new one if the latter is more specific than the former. After these procedures, the number count of guidance increases for 22 sample firms. The mode of increase is one and the most frequent type of increase is SPD.
Panel A of Table VI reports the grouping of earnings versus CAPEX guidance and Panel B reports the grouping of earnings guidance versus SPD using the updated data. We re-estimate the multinomial logit models and report them in Panels C and D. The results are similar to our previous results.
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VIII. Conclusion
As nonearnings guidance has been promoted to replace quarterly earnings guidance to mitigate earnings fixation and short-termism in the capital markets, investors' interest in nonearnings guidance, especially guidance about long-term investments and strategies, has grown. The literature, however, has only sporadic evidence about nonearnings guidance and about how managers bundle it with traditional earnings guidance.
Using hand-collected data we provide rich and current evidence on overall corporate guidance behaviors beyond earnings guidance. The large variety and high frequency of nonearnings 27 Our study focuses on the existence of guidance rather than forecast frequency. Our originally collected guidance at earnings announcement dates is representative because firms seldom provide guidance only at non-earnings announcement dates. For example, according to the CIG data, during 2001-2007 only about 8% of the firms that provided annual earnings guidance during the year do so solely at non-earnings announcement dates. For the S&P 500 sample, the percentage is 10%. 28 The coefficient on LTIO is 0.180, comparable to the previous magnitude of 0.199. The z-statistic of 1.57 is weakly significant in a one-tailed test.
Table VI. Using Guidance Collected from All Sources
We augment the original data by guidance collected from sample firms' press releases in the 90 days after the original disclosure event (i.e., earnings announcement for 2005). A guidance code is added to the data if the guidance is in a point or range estimate form and that type of guidance with that specific horizon does not already exist in the original data. Panels A and B present the updated groupings of CAPEX guidance versus earnings guidance and SPD versus earnings guidance. Panels C and D estimate the multinomial logit model using the updated data with the base group being "earnings guidance only" and the reported coefficients are incremental coefficients. EPSdecline is 1 guidance suggest that corporate guidance behaviors might not be responsible for investors' earnings fixation and widespread short-termism. The finding that long-term institutional ownership is positively associated with firms' issuing both earnings and CAPEX guidance suggests that long-term investors perhaps prefer both types of disclosures as opposed to eliminating earnings guidance. The finding that turnaround firms tend to provide SPD but growth firms do not is consistent with the economic theory that firms balance the capital-market benefits of disclosure against the product-market costs of disclosure. This finding is inconsistent with the trade associations' recommendation for firms to replace earnings guidance with investment/strategy guidance. The findings that firms tend to withhold earnings guidance after an earnings decline and that after such a decline some firms provide CAPEX guidance and SPD instead of earnings guidance suggest that investors should use caution in interpreting managers' disclosure of CAPEX guidance and SPD and nondisclosure of earnings guidance. It is rational for managers to withhold earnings guidance after poor performance because of increased difficulty in predicting earnings and because forward-looking disclosure of unfavorable earnings would decrease the stock price and consume managers' time in explaining the outlook. Disclosing investment plans and strategic actions in lieu of earnings guidance could compensate investors for the loss of earnings guidance information and is likely to be value-maximizing. On the other hand, some managers may intend to deflect their responsibility for poor performance by redirecting investors' attention to future actions; this behavior is unlikely to be value-maximizing. Either way, the disclosure of CAPEX and SPD guidance in the absence of earnings guidance does not necessarily mean that managers have shifted their focus to the long run.
Overall, our study provides a comprehensive view of managers' guidance behaviors. This view will help future researchers ask more balanced questions and design finer tests. The study also points to an important aspect that has been missing in the earnings guidance debate-the role of nonearnings guidance. While our study provides the first step in documenting managers' nonearnings guidance behaviors, future research could examine the consequences of nonearnings guidance in mitigating earnings fixation and short-termism in the capital markets.
Appendix A: Examples of Corporate Guidance
Tenet Healthcare Corp 2006 Outlook
Growth or erosion of patient volumes at our hospitals is a critical determinant of hospital and total company profitability. The expected level of patient admissions and outpatient visits is one of the most difficult element of our business to forecast as it is largely outside our direct control. Approximately 80% of expected managed care revenues in 2006 were negotiated prior to yearend 2005. Base price increases in these renegotiated contracts were generally in the range of midto high-single digits on a percentage basis.
We expect to offset a portion of the anticipated growth in controllable operating expenses (consisting of salaries, wages and benefits, supplies and other operating expense) below the applicable rate of medical cost inflation through a wide range of operating initiatives that are in various stages of implementation We will significantly reduce our costs associated with our Cidra, Puerto Rico, facility in the second half of the year. And the investments we will make to replace and upgrade manufacturing work centers will increase our capital spending in 2006. But we expect to get a full year of the benefits in 2007. This is when you see a significant improvement in our gross margins.
. The drivers for this increase in tax rate are twofold. As we saw in the second half of 2005, higher profit levels are primarily being generated in geographies with a higher tax rate. And then the tax law providing for benefits on manufacturing profits earned in Puerto Rico expired at the end of 2005.
. And with that, let me now turn the call back to Martin for a few closing remarks before we begin Q&A.
MARTIN MADAUS: Okay. Before we go into Q&A, I want to make a few comments about 2006. Our priorities for the next 12 months will be as follows. Number one, we will continue what we have started in 2005-higher levels of execution, finding new ways to drive growth and profitability over the long term for our shareholders.
Number two, we have identified and will pursue new platforms for spending potential for new revenues and profit growth. As I stated before, growth platforms will come from three sources-internal R&D, acquisitions, and alliances.
Number three, we will continue to focus on executing our global supply chain strategy. The first improvements in gross margin this quarter is a good start, and we will ensure that our execution of this program continues to go well.
Number four, we are working hard to improve R&D productivity. And under the new leadership in R&D in both divisions, I expect that we will reshape parts of our own portfolios over the next 12 months with a goal to drive greater returns from our R&D investments in the future.
And finally, we will continue to drive cultural change throughout Millipore and built an environment that rewards performance and supports the needs of a dynamic, fast-growing company. 
Appendix B: Industry Guidance Patterns
Although Table II shows that annual guidance is far more common than quarterly guidance, anecdotal evidence indicates that some firms favor the annual horizon, whereas others prefer the quarterly horizon. Such preferences are perhaps due to common industry practices or the nature of the business. For example, firms with long operating cycles may be more likely to issue annual than to issue quarterly guidance. We investigate whether some industries have a tendency to rely on annual guidance and others use predominately quarterly guidance.
Using the modified Fama-French (1997) 48 groupings, we plot the median annual guidance count (x-axis) against the median quarterly guidance count (y-axis) for the 20 industries that have the most S&P 500 firms. The figure shows that the industries scatter, indicating cross-industry differences in forecast horizon and guidance intensity. For example, drug companies provide much guidance with an annual horizon but very little with a quarterly horizon, probably because of their long product cycles. Computer and chip industries have high numbers of guidance for both annual and quarterly horizons, probably due to their ever-changing business environment and product mix. Banks, investment and trading (Wall Street firms), energy, and insurance companies provide little guidance of any kind. Intensity of Annual and Quarterly Guidance by S&P 500 Firms
